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 1 
Democratic Transition, Judicial Accountability and Judicialisation of Politics in 
Africa: The Nigerian Experience 
Introduction 
The discussion in this article follows closely on a slowly but steadily growing body of 
scholarly evaluation and analyses of what Hirschl has described as the judicialisation of 
‘pure politics.’ Courts are playing substantive critical roles in the determining the course 
and dimensions of electoral processes.1 Thus they have been involved in adjudicating 
gerrymandering issues, political party funding matters, constitutional terms of office, the 
right to participation in the democratic process, disqualification of candidates, 
recognition of political parties, validation of elections and electoral outcomes.  
   Judicial intervention has been significant in virtually all of these aspects of the 
democratic process. In particular, judicialisation of disputes on the right to participation, 
disqualification of candidates and sanction of electoral contests have had resonance in 
Nigeria’s political transition to civil rule after almost three decades of authoritarianism.2 
The inter-play of politics, law and judicial intervention on these issues in Nigeria’s 
transition constitute the foci of this article. 
   The significance of the foci of this article derives from the observation that despite the 
increasing incidence of the phenomenon of judicialisation of politics worldwide, 
academic analyses of it remains relatively superficial.3 In fact, while there has been some 
consideration of judicialisation of politics in some democratising politics in Europe, Latin 
                                                 
1
 Ran Hirschl “The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide” (2006) 
75 (2) Fordham Law Review 721 (-754), 729-730. See also Samuel Isaacharoff “Democracy and 
Collective Decision Making” (2008) 6 (2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 231 (-266). 
2
 For a discussion of the truth-telling process, accountability for human rights violations and 
transitional justice issues arising from the transition, see Hakeem Yusuf “Travails of Truth: Achieving 
Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria” (2007) 1 (2) International Journal of Transitional Justice 
268(-286). 
3
 Hirschl note 1 supra at 722. 
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America and South-East Asia, scholarly discourse on the phenomenon in Africa is 
practically non-existent.4  
   As a number of scholars, among them, Epstein et al have noted, close evaluation of the 
role of courts in the democratisation process is of particular significance in view of the 
need to integrate them in to the ‘larger governmental process.’5 Considering the gaps in 
the literature on this theme outside well established democratic systems,6 the relevance of 
an account of the African experience through the prism of the largest potential 
democracy in the continent, can not be over-stated.  
   The article aims at drawing attention to an important phenomenon in transitional 
societies in Africa in particular and the global south in general. The analyses that follow 
strongly validate the position of several legal scholars that accounts of the political 
process would be incomplete without reference to the judicial role in it.7  
   The article examines two cases that reflect the expanding incidence of judicialisation of 
politics in Nigeria’s transition experience. The Nigerian judiciary is itself complicit for its 
role in authoritarianism and remains, despite some attempts at institutional reform, 
opaque in its accountability credentials particularly even if only from the standpoint of 
transitional justice.8 The point about judicial accountability is particularly germane. Its 
significance comes up for scrutiny for at least two reasons.  
                                                 
4
 See for instance, Martin Shapiro and Alec S Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2002), Alec S Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in 
Europe (Oxford Clarendon Oxford 2004), Neil C Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder The Global Expansion of 
Judicial Power (New-York University Press New-York 1995), R Hirschl Towards Juristocracy: The 
Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press Cambridge 
Massachusetts 2004), Jiri Priban Dissidents of Law (Ashgate Dartmouth Hampshire 2002), Wojciech 
Sadurski Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Post Communist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer  Dordrecht 2005). But see, H Kwasi Prempeh “Marbury in Africa: 
Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa” (2006) Tulane Law 
Review 80: 1239 and Tamir Moustafa “Law versus the State: The Judicialisation of Politics in Egypt” 
(2003) 28 (4) Law and Social Inquiry 883.  
5
 Lee Epstein et al “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of 
Democratic Systems of Government” (2001) 35 (1) Law & Society Review 117 (-164), 119. 
6
 Ibid. at 118.  
7
 Ibid. at 120. 
8
 Hakeem O Yusuf “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial 
Accountability in Nigeria” (2008) 30 (2) Law and Policy 194 (-226). 
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   First, courts in the country have been central to setting the ground rules for a rather 
elusive rule of law in the democratisation process.  Second, the judiciary’s current 
interventions in the political sphere (which have been incremental) have largely centred 
on political accountability. It thus remarkable that notwithstanding it accountability 
deficit, the judiciary has assumed a primal position in the institutional political power 
constellation in the country, particularly in the past two years.  
    The first section presents critical analyses of the phenomenon of judicialisation of 
politics in the country. The second section focuses on judicial accountability, advancing 
the argument that the limited success of the institutional mechanism in place is a 
consequence of a flawed transitional justice management process. The third examines the 
consequences of politicisation of the judiciary. This is followed by the conclusion of the 
implications of the interaction of judicialised politics, imperatives of accountability and 
politicisation of the judiciary for the judicial function in transitional polities.  
Judicialisation of politics in Nigeria’s transition: a contemporary account  
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with a population of about a hundred and 
forty million people. Its size and oil resources have seen it play an important role in the 
continent. The country’s written republican constitution, allocates the powers of the 
federal state among the branches of government – the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary.  
   The operative 1999 Constitution is conceived as a foundation for a constitutional 
democracy with wide powers of judicial review granted to the courts. The country 
operates a presidential system and a two-tier legislature at the federal level, the National 
Assembly consisting of the Senate (upper chamber) and the House of Representatives 
(lower chamber). The 36 states each have a House of Assembly, a unicameral legislature.  
  The judiciary has wide powers of judicial review. Adopting Epstein et al’s 
characterisation of constitutional courts, judicial review in the country’s court system 
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though very close to the American system, is best described as a hybrid.9   Like the 
American system, the Nigerian court system features a diffusion of the power of judicial 
review. This is marked by the absence of a constitutional court but rather, a general 
power of judicial review vested on all ‘courts of superior records.’ These are the high 
courts (usually, but not always first instance trial courts in important civil matters relevant 
to the discussion in this article), the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  
   The courts possess only concrete, as against abstract, judicial review powers and the 
locus required to initiate the process are circumscribed, vested in individuals or groups 
who can establish a real stake in the outcome of the process. From cursory examination 
of judicial practice coupled with a close reading of the provisions of Sections 6 and 46 of 
the 1999 Constitution, disclose the Nigerian system of judicial review accommodates 
both ex ante and ex post facto judicial review. This is a quality it shares with some European 
constitutional courts.10 The powers of judicial review identified here lie at the heart of 
evaluations of the judicialisation of politics in the Nigerian democratisation process 
discussed in this article.  
   A number of dynamics has led to the rise to prominence of judicial power in Nigeria’s 
transition experience. Dysfunctional institutions, inordinate power contestations among 
the political elite, glaring deficit in the political and democratic legitimacy of the 
transition process have converged to make the judicialisation of politics an issue if not the 
issue in Nigeria’s transition. The trend has accelerated in the past two years. The 
phenomenon reached a crescendo in the build up to and the immediate period after the 
2007 elections in the country.    
AC v INEC- when ‘high politics’ meets ‘high law’ 
                                                 
9
 Epstein et al note 5 supra at 121. 
10
 Epstein et al note 5 at 121.  
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In the case, Action Congress (AC) and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar v Independent National Electoral 
Commission (AC v INEC),11 judicial intervention was enlisted by prominent political actors, 
to settle the ground rules on the contentious issue of individual participation and 
exclusion in the political process. The facts of the case were as contentious as the high 
stakes of political office in which they arose; eligibility for elections into the presidency of 
a developing, leading oil-producing country. The case is in fact, one of a series, more 
than a dozen, instituted by the 2nd Plaintiff/Appellant to stave off the multi-pronged 
attempts to exclude him from participating in the 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria. 
The case arose against a background of serious power tussle and intrigues in the highest 
quarters of governance in the country. 
Background    
The Action Congress, 1st Plaintiff/Appellant (AC) is an opposition political in Nigeria 
formed in September 2006. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, 2nd Plaintiff/Appellant (the Vice-
President) was at all times material to the facts of the case, incumbent Vice-President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  He had been sworn in on May 29 2003 alongside 
President Olusegun Obasanjo (the President), for a second and final constitutionally 
prescribed four year-term. They were both of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) at 
the time of the election. The Independent National Electoral Commission, the 
Defendant (INEC) is the constitutionally recognised executive agency responsible for the 
conduct of presidential, gubernatorial and federal legislative elections in the country.  
   After their inauguration and before the next elections scheduled for the first quarter of 
2007 however, the relationship between the two had virtually broken down. In the main, 
this was due to the surreptitious bid of the President to secure a third term through a 
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 (2007) 6 S.C Pt. II 212 (-314). 
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constitutional amendment. The ‘Third Term Project,’12  as it was known in Nigerian 
political circles, created a lot of acrimony on the socio-political landscape. 
   Not unexpectedly, it had some support from a small cabal of the President’s loyalists 
but was fiercely opposed by majority of the political elite, including leading members of 
his ruling party, the PDP. It similarly elicited serious opposition from the public. To the 
relief of most stakeholders in the Nigerian political transition, the Senate frustrated the 
bid when majority of its members rejected the proposed constitutional amendment on 16 
May, 2006.13 But from then on, noted opponents of the Third Term Project were 
mobilised against by the forces behind the aborted bid. 
   Prime target in that category was the Vice-President, himself, a long-standing 
presidential hopeful. He had led political opposition to the President’s ambition.  The 
situation led to an open rift and dissension in the presidency. At a point, the President 
withdrew all his privileges and staff and rendered him redundant while also going public 
with the plan to remove him from office through the legislature. But the moves to have 
the legislature remove the Vice-President failed.  Following his expulsion from the PDP, 
he joined the AC and declared his presidential ambition on the latter’s platform.  
   It had however become obvious that the President (and his loyalists in the PDP) were 
determined to circumvent the attempts of the Vice-President to contest the elections. 
The former then set out to frustrate the move by deploying varied administrative and 
political mechanisms in what came to be the most profound instance of political elite-
power wrangling within a civil administration in the country. Elite power-wrangling has 
                                                 
12
 Gilbert da Costa “Nigerian Senate Denies Obasanjo Third Term” Voice of America available at: 
  http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-05/2006-05-16-
voa68.cfm?CFID=269274608&CFTOKEN=30412515 (last accessed 6 March 2008). 
13
 Editorial “Triumph of The National Assembly” This Day (Abuja Wednesday 17 May 2006) available 
at: http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=48372 (last accessed 11 March 2008). See also Daniel 
K Posner and Daniel J Young “The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa” (2007) 18 (3) 
Journal of Democracy 126, 127. 
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become a defining feature of the current civil transition and democratisation process in 
Nigeria.  
   The AC and the Vice-President took this action to challenge the decision of INEC to 
disqualify the Vice-President and exclude him from contesting in the presidential poll. 
INEC had based its decision on the purported indictment of the Vice-President by an 
Administrative Panel of Inquiry (Panel) set up by the Federal Government. This 
followed his investigation by the dreaded Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC).  
   The Panel, set up by the President had found the Vice-President culpable for abuse of 
office in his capacity as the Chairman of the Petroleum Development Fund, one of the 
agencies under the office of the Vice-President. The Federal Government, in a White 
Paper, accepted the indictment which was reportedly gazetted. 
  The suit instituted at the Federal High Court was decided in favour of the AC and the 
Vice-President about two months later. The trial court held in substance that INEC has 
no power to disqualify a candidate presented to it by a political party from contesting the 
2007 elections. Dissatisfied, INEC appealed. The Court of Appeal in its decision 
delivered barely a month later, allowed the appeal and AC and the Vice-President 
appealed to the Supreme Court (the Court). 
   They sought the determination of the apex of the constitutionality of a non-judicial 
agency of government disqualifying a candidate duly sponsored and nominated by a 
political party for elective office, namely the presidency. Their case essentially rested on 
the juxtaposition of the constitutional provisions on grounds for disqualification of 
persons from the presidential elections and the Vice-President’s fundamental right to fair 
hearing.  
   Specifically, the Court was invited to construe Section 137 (1) (i) which provides that  a 
person shall not be qualified for election to the office of president if he has been indicted 
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for embezzlement or fraud by a Judicial Commission of Inquiry or an Administrative 
Panel of Inquiry or a Tribunal set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, a Tribunals of 
Inquiry Law or any other law by the Federal or State Government if the indictment has 
been accepted by the Federal or State Government, respectively.  
   The Court was expected to determine whether INEC, a non-judicial agency could 
enforce or invoke the exclusionary provisions in view of constitutional provisions on 
judicial powers in Section 6 and the fundamental right to fair hearing contained in 
Section 36 (1), (4)-(12) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (the 
Constitution). These questions were all to be determined in ‘the context of the system of 
constitutional democracy established for the country by the Constitution.’14  
   AC and the Vice-President invited the Court to consider whether the Court of Appeal 
was right in upholding the disqualification of the Vice-President under the provisions of 
the Electoral Act 2006. The Plaintiffs argued that contrary to the provisions of Section 
21 of the Electoral Act, 2002 which vested the power to disqualify candidates in the 
Defendant, Section 32 of the Electoral Act, 2006 has since divested the latter of such 
powers which it now vests exclusively in the courts. The Defendant thus lacked the 
authority to screen, verify or disqualify candidates for elections including the 2nd Plaintiff 
vying for election as presidential candidate.15  
   The Court distilled the issues in contention to determination of a fundamental question. 
It was namely, whether the Defendant has the power to disqualify any candidate 
sponsored by a political party having regard to the Constitution and Electoral Act 2006 
which governed the conduct of elections in the country. The Court thus considered the 
provisions of the Electoral Act and the Constitution, noting that it was required to 
                                                 
14
 AC v INEC note 11 supra at 222. 
15
 Ibid. at 222-223. 
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consider them together to ‘give effect and meaning to the rights and obligation of 
individuals.’16  
   At the hearing of the appeal barely two weeks after it was filed, the Court delivered a 
summary judgement after a brief conference of the justices in camera, with a promise to 
deliver the detailed reasons for the decision on 29 June 2007. In its unanimous decision 
allowing the appeal, the Court held that the Defendant lacked constitutional or statutory 
powers to disqualify any candidate in the 2007 elections.   
   The Court stated that the Defendant was not empowered by section 137(1) (i), or any 
other provisions of the Constitution, in view of the fundamental right to fair hearing 
guaranteed by Section 36(1) and (5) to exclude a candidate from elective office. Only a 
conviction by a court of law was sufficient to constitute a bar to eligibility to contest for 
public office. It held further that Section 32 of the Electoral Act had shifted 
responsibility for the disqualification of candidates for an election to the Courts. 
 Floundering Politics, Strong Judges    
A critical analyses of AC v INEC brings to the fore some of the most important features 
of judicialisation of politics in Nigeria’s transition to democratic governance.17 One of 
these is the way in which the political branch positively creates a predisposing 
environment for the increasing incidence of judicialisation of politics.  
   In this regard it is significant that in the Electoral Act, 2002 legislature had conferred 
the power to disqualify candidates screened and nominated by political parties for 
elective positions on INEC, the Defendant. However, as Onnoghen JSC noted,      
‘Fortunately or unfortunately’18 the Electoral Act, 2002 was repealed by Section 165 (1) 
                                                 
16
 AC v INEC note 11 supra at 228. 
17
 ‘Civil’ governance is, in the view of certain commentators, the incontestable and appropriate 
description of what the transition has achieved, rather than the aspirational ‘democratic rule.’ In all 
events, the country can at only be minimally described as ‘democratising.’ 
18
 AC v INEC note 11 supra at 251. 
 10 
of the Electoral Act, 2006. In enacting the latter legislation, the National Assembly did 
not consider it apt to confer the power to exclude candidates on the Defendant. 
   Why, it may be asked, did the legislature take this radical step? After all, selection of 
candidates, their verification, qualification to stand election and ancillary matters are 
properly regarded as some of the most profoundly political matters in a democracy. 
Being matters of such purely political nature, it is logical to expect the political branches 
to preserve their determination in the political domain.  
   Ironically, it would appear that it is precisely the intense interest of the political class in 
the issue that is responsible for positively shifting determination of contestations on 
candidacy to the apolitical branch. Smarting from the arbitrary use of that power by the 
Defendant during the 2003 elections, segments of the public and the political class short 
changed by its abuse condemned it. Incidentally, the decision in AC v INEC highlights 
the relevant situational context of the legislative preference.  
   It is important to note in this regard that previous legislation regulating electoral 
processes in the country, the Electoral Act of 1982 and 2002 conferred exclusive powers 
on nomination of candidates on political parties and the courts upheld this power in a 
line of cases challenging the nomination and candidates’ selection processes. The courts 
invariably declined jurisdiction over such matters.  
   Thus in Onuoha v R.B.K Okafor 19 the Court decided that upon the construction of the 
provisions of the Electoral Act, 1982, a political party has the exclusive reserved right to 
choose a candidate to sponsor for political office. The Courts are precluded from 
reviewing the exercise of the right because it is a domestic right and in the nature of a 
political question. The position was reaffirmed in Dalhatu v Turaki 20 decided on similar 
provisions of the Electoral Act, 2002. Thus, Tobi JSC had stated that 
                                                 
19
 (1983) 2 SCNLR 244.  
20
 (2003) 15 NWLR Pt. 843 300. 
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               From the decision of this court in Onuoha, it is clear that the right to sponsor a  
               candidate by a party is not a legal right but a domestic right of the party which  
               cannot be questioned in a Court of law. The political organization has a  
               discretion in the matter, a discretion which is unbelted in the sense that a Court  
               of Law has no jurisdiction to question its exercise one way or the other.21  
 
   Judicial mediation of the process of nomination and selection of candidates would 
involve the courts in the domestic affairs of political parties, a jurisdiction outside its 
purview.  This remained the situation of the law in the immediate period of the transition 
to civil rule and the first two elections of 1999 and 2003. As mentioned earlier however, 
all that has changed with the passage of the Electoral Act, 2006.     
   Ogbuagu JSC was quite forthcoming on why the legislature stripped the electoral 
commission and the political parties of this far-reaching power. He observed rightly that 
the negative consequences of the use of the powers by the electoral commissions played 
a significant part in the decision of the legislature to amend the provisions of the 
electoral law. He noted the noted that in the past           
               some candidates were said or alleged to have been disqualified on the very day  
               of some of the elections or when some of the elections were in progress… I  
               believe that the framers or law-makers of the Electoral Act, 2006 and the  
               Constitution, saw or foresaw the inherent danger of such power being  
               misused or abused and/or used arbitrarily or in bad faith and therefore, in very  
               clear and plain language, did not include such power in both the Constitution  
               and the Act.22 
 
                                                 
21
  Dalhatu v Turaki note 20 supra at 347. 
22
 AC v INEC note 11 supra at 265. 
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   Thus, disenchantment with the exercise of an otherwise political power informed the 
decision to cede it to the judiciary. This was done obviously in the expectation that it 
would be neutrally and judiciously exercised. In this way, the action of the political 
branches, for in this case, the two were actively involved and the debates over the 
Electoral Act, 2006, generated considerable interest in the country. It also signalled an 
admission of the failure in the management of the political process by an executive 
agency of government.    
  Right in the Shadow of Power         
 Another feature of the judicialisation of politics thrown up by the case is the resolution 
of disputes around the intersection of individual and group rights with resonance for 
governance in the polity. This is reflected in the Court’s rejection of the contention by 
the Defendant that it was empowered to disqualify the 2nd Plaintiff from participating in 
the 2007 elections by virtue of the provisions of Section 137 (1) (i) which it purported 
was a self-executing provision.  
   The Court ‘not impressed by this contention’23 insisted that invoking the provisions to 
disqualify a candidate would require a judicial inquiry. The tribunal or administrative 
panel that made the inquiry must be one within the contemplation of Section 137(1) (i). 
Further, the conduct of the tribunal’s (or panel) proceedings must comply with the fair 
hearing principles guaranteed by the constitution, namely the right to be heard by an 
impartial court or tribunal based on the presumption of innocence.  
   On this latter count, the Court held that the Defendant erred by relying on the report 
of the Panel to disqualify the 2nd Plaintiff since the Panel’s operations infringed on the 
constitutional rights of the 2nd Plaintiff to fair hearing. Further, the imposition of 
penalties could only follow on a trial by a judicially constituted forum. Katsina-Alu JSC 
eloquently enunciated this position in the lead judgement 
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 AC v INEC note 11 supra at 229. 
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               …trial and conviction by a court is the only constitutionally permitted way to  
               prove guilt…the imposition of the penalty of disqualification for  
               embezzlement or fraud solely on the basis of an indictment for these offences  
               by an administrative panel of inquiry implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to    
               Section 36 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999…       
               convictions for offences and imposition of penalties and punishments are  
               matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power.24 
   
   Constitutional law scholars have noticed the critical role courts have in confronting the 
designs of incumbents in power to circumvent democratic competition through artful 
control of electoral bodies like INEC.25 An important feature of the Supreme Court 
decision in this case is the decisive judicial role in a struggle to open up a deliberate 
constriction of democratic space for access to power by an incumbent intent on 
subversion of the rule of law and the democratic process.      
Amaechi v INEC- power by the grace of the courts 
The high-wired political and legal intrigues in Rt. Hon. Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi v 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & 2 Ors (Amaechi v INEC)26 led to a yet 
unprecedented level of judicial intervention in the political process in the country’s recent 
democratisation experience. In particular, the far reaching consequences of the Supreme 
Court decision in the case which informs its choice for discussion here justifies a fairly 
detailed exposition of the facts. 
  The dispute between the parties arose out of preparations for the conduct of the 
gubernatorial polls scheduled for 14 April, 2007, an integral part of the milestone civil-
civil-transition elections in the country.  In pursuit of his ambition to be the party’s 
                                                 
24
 Ibid. at 230. Emphasis mine. 
25
 Isaacharoff note 1 supra at 264. 
26
 (2008) 1 S.C. Pt. I 36 (-302). 
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governorship candidate in Rivers State,27 Rotimi Amaechi, the Plaintiff/Appellant 
(Amaechi), contested the gubernatorial primaries of his party, the People’s Democratic 
Party, 3rd Defendant/Respondent (the PDP) alongside seven other members. He had 
been the Speaker of the House of Assembly since the civil transition in 1999.   
   Amaechi won an overwhelming victory at the primaries. He polled 6, 527 of the 6, 575 
cast votes. Celestine Omehia, the 2nd Defendant/Respondent (Omehia) did not 
participate in the primaries. On 14 December, 2006, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Electoral Act 2006, the PDP submitted Amaechi’s name to the Independent National 
Electoral Commission, 1st Defendant/Respondent (INEC), as its candidate in the state 
for the gubernatorial elections. INEC, it would be recalled is the agency responsible for 
the conduct of gubernatorial and national elections in the country.  
   Sometime after, it made the rounds that PDP was contemplating substituting Amaechi 
as its candidate. In a pre-emptive move, Amaechi instituted this action on 26 January 
2007 at the Federal High Court (trial court), to stop INEC from giving effect to his 
planned substitution. However, on 2 February 2007, the PDP went on to write a letter to 
INEC forwarding Omehia’s name as its candidate, stating that Amaechi’s was submitted 
‘in error.’  On Amaechi’s application, the trial court ordered Omehia and PDP to be 
joined as parties to the suit.   
   Amaechi claimed a number of reliefs. Principal among them was a declaration that by 
virtue of Section 32 (5) of the Electoral Act, 2006, it was only open to a political party or 
the INEC to substitute a candidate submitted to the latter, in compliance with a court 
order. He similarly sought a declaration that INEC has no power to screen, verify or 
disqualify a candidate who presented to it as its nominee by a political party. The 
                                                 
27
 An oil-rich state in the Niger Delta. 
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purported act of substitution of his name should be declared unconstitutional, illegal and 
unlawful.28 
   INEC’s defence rested on PDP’s right of choice of candidate. INEC argued it was 
bound to uphold the party’s decision since it was notified of it within statutorily 
prescribed time for such action. Further, INEC claimed that justification for the party’s 
substitution of Amaechi had been furnished by the latter’s indictment in the government 
White Paper that emanated from the Administrative Panel set up to review the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s investigation report  on him and others 
vying for office in the 2007 elections.29     
   The argument advanced for Omehia was simply that the submission of Amaechi’s 
name by the PDP was ‘in error,’ and this has been corrected with the submission of 
Omehia’s name in substitution. More importantly, Omehia argued, the sponsorship of a 
candidate for elective office by a party was ‘not a guaranteed right of any member.’ Thus 
Amaechi, or any other individual at that, had no statutory or constitutional right to be 
sponsored by a party as its candidate for an election.30 
   On 15 March, 2007, the trial court ruled that though the reason advanced by the PDP 
for Amaechi’s substitution satisfied the Electoral Act, 2006, the actual act of substitution 
was invalid because the letter which communicated the decision was written after the 
matter was sub judice. Dissatisfied, he appealed to the Court of Appeal. For also setting 
aside the letter of the PDP containing the reason it substituted Amaechi, PDP and 
Omehia also cross-appealed. In the course of the appeal before the Court of Appeal, a 
number of events with significance for the outcome of the case occurred. In view of 
their critical bearing on politicisation of the judiciary in Nigeria’s transition experience 
generally, they would be discussed below.  
                                                 
28
 Amaechi v INEC note 26 supra at 54-56. 
29
 Ibid. at 56-57. 
30
 Ibid. at 58. 
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   Suffice it to say at this point that one of such events was the holding of the election in 
view at the time Amaechi instituted the action before the trial court. Omehia was 
declared the winner of that election. The chain of events also led to the appeal 
proceeding for final determination by the Supreme Court and an additional prayer by 
Amaechi that he be declared the winner of the election.  
Constitutional challenge to political perfidy 
At the core of the facts in Amaechi v INEC is the challenge posed by the highly perfidious 
political conduct adopted by a powerful section of the political elite in the post-
authoritarian transition politics in the country. As the Court noted, Omehia did not 
evince an intention to be the party’s candidate which was required, even in accordance 
with the party’s constitution, through participation in the primaries, which in this case 
involved eight candidates. So, the party was in breach of its own constitution.  
   The Court deplored PDP’s breach of its own constitution, the existence and 
observance of which is a constitutionally created obligation of political parties. The Court 
noted that the statutory requirement that INEC be notified of a political party’s internal 
arrangements for holding its primaries preparatory to fielding candidates and the optional 
right of INEC to observe the proceedings was designed to enhance intra-party 
democracy in order to ensure that and ensure ‘our democracy is truly reflective of the 
people’s choice.’ So there is simply no room for a candidate, like Omehia, who never 
contested a primary election, to emerge a party candidate.  
   Clearly, the facts of Amaechi v INEC are a manifestation of the peculiar setting. It is 
only in the peculiar setting of utter disregard for, and subversion of the basic tenets of 
democracy and due process that a candidate who did not contest his party’s primaries 
(where it is required as in this case, by the party’s constitution) be substituted for one that 
emerged in the primaries with an overwhelming majority, and be presented to the 
electorate as the party’s flag-bearer.                  
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   The extent of the perfidy involved is better appreciated in the against the background 
that independent candidacy is constitutionally precluded by section 221 of the 
Constitution which expressly provides that only a political party can canvass for votes for 
candidates. Thus the judiciary in this case was faced with a classic case of gross abuse of 
constitutional privilege by a hegemonic group under the auspices of democratic design. 
Such is the hold of the hegemonic group on power that its candidate, the glaring illegality 
notwithstanding, went on to win the elections.  
   In a sophisticated socio-political setting, the perversion of the democratic will as 
happened in this case would cost the PDP dearly. Its perfidy should provide the crest for 
an opposition candidate to ride to victory. As stated above, this did not happen. There 
are dimensions to this curious situation outside well outside the scope of this article. 
Suffice it to say that the dynamics surrounding the political practices in Nigeria’s recent 
democratisation process, justify a key role for the judiciary in deepening democratic 
culture, as demonstrated by the comprehensive analyses of the two cases in this article.      
Beyond Common Electoral Questions 
The Court’s consternation at PDP’s breach of its own constitution connects with a very 
controversial aspect of the decision, namely what to do with the fait accompli of an illegally 
imposed candidate who has run and emerged victorious in the election. There are two 
overlapping but separate strands in this issue. First, is the aspect that the dispute arose as 
a pre-election matter. Second is the nature of the relief that ought to be granted to 
Amaechi in the light of the supervening event of the gubernatorial election conducted 
with the participation of the electorate and the emergence of Omehia as the winner.   
   Critical reflection on the foregoing aspect of the case suggests it is at this point that the 
Court shifts from the terrain of adjudicating ordinary questions of electoral selection31 
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more common in the literature on judicialisation of politics.32 Qualitatively, the dispute in 
the case transforms to exploration of key polity issues. The dispute takes on the 
colouration of what Isaacharof and Hirschl refer to as ‘first-order questions’33 which 
address ‘contemplating the very definition, or raison d’ etre of the polity’ respectively.34   
   The complicated political terrain that confronted the Court in Amaechi v INEC suggests 
the need for possible rethink on the nature of electoral design and democratic selection 
adjudication component of judicialised politics. The case provides substantial premise for 
the position that contrary to what seems to be the canonical view, depending on the 
context, otherwise electoral matters may well generate political situations that confront 
the courts with issues that define fundamental existential questions of the polity, 
particularly in transitional contexts.  
   Some scholars of comparative constitutional law, notably Hirschl and Isaacharoff are 
likely to disagree with this view. They do not regard the electoral adjudicatory dimension 
of judicialisation of politics as momentous enough to go to the very foundations of the 
state. This would appear to be in part a result of their focus largely on well established 
democracies.35  
   It is understandable that in a liberal and well established democratic context, various 
refined institutional buffers serve to blunt possible sharp edges off electoral disputations. 
Thus, it is quite difficult to encounter cases adjudicated on facts bounded in high-
powered intrigues that challenge the fundamental existential basis of the polity as did the 
facts in Amaechi v INEC.  
   However, it is quite instructive that for all of the strength of such institutional buffers 
in an advanced liberal democracy like the United States, the decision in US Supreme 
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Court in Bush v Gore36 generated a wave of public reassessment of the role and powers of 
that court in its democracy. There is for instance the intense and seemingly endless 
stream of legal and political review and commentary that have trailed the decision, years 
after it was delivered. The response to the case reinforces the view that adjudication of 
otherwise customary electoral matters may yield far-reaching socio-legal issues on the 
foundational arrangements of a polity. 
   As stated above, Amaechi v INEC is remarkable in the way the dispute in it transcends 
disputations of a purely ‘intra-party dispute’37or contestation in an electoral process. It 
raises the fundamental question of whom or what constitutes the relevant demos in the 
context of a troubled democratising polity. Should a person who never contested an 
election be declared a winner in the bid to checkmate political actors devoted to 
subverting the rule of law and due process? However, it is curious that the fundamental 
shift to theoretical and foundational democratic issues constituted by this aspect of the 
case was made unacknowledged, even denied, by the Supreme Court.  
   The Court’s disclamation of the fundamental majoritarian dimension, and salient issues 
of democratic norms implicated in the case, is reflected in its response to the challenge 
on the crucial supervening incident. Note that this was an election in which close to half 
a million of the electorate in Rivers State voted with the participation of 20 political 
parties (including the PDP). It led to Omehia’s emergence as the governor in the results 
posted for the election by INEC showed.38  
Squaring a circle: (un) democratic norms v (un) rule of law 
It was argued for Omehia that to declare Amaechi the winner of an election which he did 
not win would negate fundamental principles of democracy.  The Court insisted that 
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since the case originated as an intra-party dispute, the question of who would emerge the 
winner at the election was ‘irrelevant and not in issue.’39  
   Oguntade JSC stated that the ‘central issue’ was that Amaechi, not Omehia contested 
and won the primaries. Thus, the victory of the latter at the elections made him ‘no more 
than a pretender to the office.’40 And it was appropriate for Amaechi, who had brought a 
‘pre-election’41 matter to court, to step in to an office gained after the election because he 
had sought declaration that he was the PDP candidate duly nominated for it. The Court 
granted this relief and proceeded to declare that in view of the granted relief, he was also 
the elected Governor of Rivers State. The attitude of the court on this point creates a 
significant paradox.  
   It is important to unpack the legal and descriptive paradox created by the decision to 
declare as winner, a candidate wrongfully excluded by internal party intrigues as the 
winner in the same election. It serves to recall that the whole case originated from a claim 
of right by Amaechi to majority votes he won at the party primaries which entitled him 
to contest as the PDP’s gubernatorial aspirant in the election.  
   A dilemma beyond the semantic, (and there appears to be one in the Court’s choice of 
words in the judgement on the point), arises as to what is meant by the assertion that 
Omehia is a ‘pretender to the office.’ The ‘office’ is ostensibly that of the governor to 
which Omehia was eventually elected by overwhelming majority votes, if we forget for 
the moment that he did not contest the primaries. And also that as at the time he 
contested as the PDP candidate, his nomination had in fact been nullified by the trial 
court though the case was on appeal, but more of that later. He did contest and win the 
election, the ultimate step to the ‘office’ in view. 
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   In rationalising the paradox, the Court per Oguntade JSC in the lead judgement 
averred that  
               The one unchanging feature is that PDP was the sponsoring party… I  
               ought not to allow my approach to this case to be influenced by a consideration  
               of the fact that PDP eventually won the election. Even if Omehia had lost the  
               election, this court would still be entitled to declare that it was Amaechi and not  
               Omehia who was PDP’s candidate for the Election.42  
 
The Court insisted that any argument to the effect that a new election should be ordered 
as a consequence of its nullification of Omehia’s candidacy, fails to take cognisance of 
the fact that the case is an appeal on a dispute between two members as to who was the 
validly nominated candidate of the party rather than an election petition.  
   Admittedly, the Court found itself in an unprecedented legal conundrum in the 
country’s history. To resolve the difficulty, it however adopted a legal formalism43 that 
led it to an adjudication steeped in an artificial construct distant from situational reality. 
The reality being the incidence of an election in which close to two hundred thousand 
voters made a choice of a candidate presented on a usurped ticket.  
    In declaring Amaechi the winner of an election he did not participate in, the Court 
stated an intention to avoid ‘a dangerous precedent’44 that would require fresh elections 
be ordered whenever a wrongly nominated candidate is presented to the electorate in a 
election, irrespective of whether he goes on to eventually win. A sure way out of the 
quagmire it reasoned, was to disregard the result of the ensuing election because  
               The duty of the court is to answer the question which of two contending  
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               candidates was the validly nominated candidate for the election. It is purely an  
               irrelevant matter whether the candidate in the election who was improperly allowed to  
               contest wins or loses. The candidate that wins the case on the judgement of the  
               court simply steps into the shoes of his invalidly nominated opponent whether  
               loser or winner.45 
   The Court argued that its jurisprudential preference is based on constitutional statutory 
provisions that excludes independent candidacy. In this regard, the Court held that since 
in view of the provisions of Section 221 of the Constitution, a candidate can not contest 
an election without a political party, it then follows that it is a party that wins an election. 
As Aderemi JSC puts it ‘it is the political parties that the electorate do vote for at election 
time.’46 The fact that ‘a good or bad candidate may enhance or diminish the prospect of 
his party in winning’ does not detract from the fact that the electoral contest is ‘between 
parties’ and ‘at the end of the day, it is the party that wins or loses an election.’47  
   In premising its decision to grant the relief of declaring Amaechi the elected candidate, 
on the argument that the electoral contest is essentially an inter-party contest, the Court 
took the preposterous view that irrespective of the candidate fielded by a party, it would 
still win or lose an election. In this, the Court completely discounted the salience of 
voting across party lines which may, in appropriate contexts, prove decisive in electoral 
outcomes. 
The pre-election argument- when the past counts more than the present 
It is germane to explore the ‘pre-election’ premise of the decision further considering its 
centrality to the Court’s decision. According to the Court, Section 285 (2) of the 
Constitution vests the power to order fresh elections only on the Elections Petitions 
Tribunal. While it agreed the matter was election-related, it remained a pre-election 
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dispute. It was however a critical issue that the election had been held. The insistence of 
the Court to treat the case as a pre-election dispute ought also to have confined it to 
granting consequential reliefs that flow only from that foundation. It ought to have 
ignored a relief that amounted to overreaching the interest of other stake-holders in the 
subject of the dispute.    
   In order words, it was disingenuous that the Court proceeded on the footing that the 
matter was a pre-election dispute only to conclude by granting a relief that was clearly 
post-election in its effect. There is an apparent contradiction in such an approach that 
appears at once to approbate and reprobate. The Court appeared to have in fact boxed 
itself into a corner on this aspect of its decision, when it noted that it could not order 
fresh elections because a prayer to do so was not before it.  
   In addition to its widely stated judicial power under the Constitution, it further 
possesses a liberally couched discretion conferred by Section 22 of the Supreme Court 
Act 1990, to grant consequential reliefs. But it is trite that all judicial powers are to be 
exercised judiciously. This latter point has been oft-repeated in the decisions and dicta of 
the Court. In this case however, the Court ended up ignoring this imperative in judicial 
decision-making. 
   Even more telling is the Court’s own observation that the other parties who 
participated in the election were not before it. 48 Here again, it is evident the Court 
displayed no scruples in its neglect of the rights of the other political parties with a stake 
in the outcome of the casein, all twenty of them, that participated in the elections. But 
this is precisely what the Court did by not ordering fresh elections. 
   Again, the question bears asking, what was the legal basis for granting consequential 
orders clearly inextricable from facts the Court refused to take cognisance of? And these 
were facts directly relevant to the case, supervening though they may be. On this score, 
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Aderemi JSC offers a response unique to his contribution in the unanimous decision, 
equitable principles. He held that for the Court to order a fresh election in the 
circumstances of the case ‘will negate all notions of equitable principles and of course, 
true justice.’49  
   It is apposite to observe that this view of equity is as restrictive in its conception as to 
lose all relevance in its application. Surely, equity as a legal principle, more than any other, 
commends the very contrary of the Court’s position. This is the case when the interest of 
all affected parties, which necessarily includes the millions of people of Rivers State and 
their constitutional right to decide through majority votes, who the actual (individual-
candidate), as against the notional (party-candidate), governor, is brought into the 
equation. But the Court apparently felt otherwise.                 
Rule of law as fall-guy 
Notice how the Court arrives at a jurisprudential conundrum in Amaechi v INEC. It 
arrives at this troubling destination through the conflation of constitutional provisions 
on structural political arrangements, individual fair hearing rights, right to participation in 
the democratic process and majoritarian democratic principles. In seeking justification 
for its inexcusable conflation of fundamentally distinct constitutional values, the Court 
takes recourse to another important issue seriously implicated in the facts of the case in 
particular, and the politics of transition in Nigeria in general, rule of law.  
   It would be shown in a moment that in proffering the rule of law as basis for its 
judgement, in whole or part, the Court sought refuge in the important (commonly elusive) 
principle, as a fall-guy. Put in another way, the Supreme Court propped up the rule of 
law to take the flak from its highly defeasible judgement sustained essentially by the 
finality of its decisions in the country’s legal system.   
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   The Court emphasised the imperative of observing due process by the political parties 
in the conduct of their otherwise internal affairs. It noted that while the PDP was not 
wrongly headed in seeking to substitute a candidate, it was bound to do so in conformity 
with due process of law. However, in failing to observe the ground rules on an otherwise 
legitimate quest, PDP’s purported action of substitution had been in futility. According 
to the Court ‘In the eyes of the law’ Amaechi’s nomination earlier forwarded to INEC 
remained intact. 50  Thus, the candidate that wins in court ‘simply steps into the shoes of 
his invalidly nominated opponent whether as loser or winner.’51 
   Curiously, the Court found sufficient grounds in this failure of due process on the part 
of a political party, for a jurisprudential preference that fundamentally undermines the 
expression of the majoritarian will of the people of Rivers State at large. The latter it 
must be noted, is represented by an electorate, a couple of millions strong, some of 
whom exercised their democratic rights at the election, albeit voting for the wrongly 
presented candidate, Omehia, as governor.  
  It is logical for the Court to decide the issue of nomination from the footing of its pre-
election origin, and resolve the illegality of Amaechi’s substitution in his favour as it did. 
But declaring as winner, a candidate that did not participate in an election would appear 
no less reprehensible than the action of the PDP and INEC in imposing Omehia illegally 
in the first place, the origin of the dispute before the Court. The decision of the Court is 
decidedly more problematic where it constitutes judicial imposition that effectively 
trumps the general democratic will, the very value the Court ironically proclaimed it was 
protecting.     
   There is good reason to argue that the appropriate consequential order required to 
meet the justice of the case was to order fresh elections in the state with Amaechi as the 
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PDP candidate. But as mentioned above, the Court declined this route on the excuse that 
it lacked the power to do so. The Court’s position would have perhaps been apposite but 
for the force of the country’s common law precedent tradition which points in the 
legitimacy of making orders for this rejected option.    
   The recourse of the Court to the need for protecting the integrity of the rule of law in 
the political process, undoubtedly affronted by the actions of the Defendants in this 
case,52 however rings hollow on a cursory reading of the whole judgement itself. A 
pertinent point missed in this regard is the fact that as at the time Omehia contested the 
elections on 14 April 2007, his substitution for Amaechi had been voided by the Federal 
High Court in its decision of 15 March 2007. The decision subsisted till 20 July 2007 
when it was set aside by the Court of Appeal. In this wise, Katsina-Alu JSC stated that ‘It 
goes without any argument that the 2nd respondent’s participation in the election was 
clearly an illegal act.’53 
  Thus, Omehia was not only wrongly substituted for Amaechi, but also in contempt of 
court when he contested. How then could such victory, doubly lacking in legality be 
transferred to Amaechi? Plainly, Omehia’s participation in the election was pitiably devoid 
of any modicum of rule of law value the Court sought to salvage. Certainly the rule of 
law is sooner even if unwittingly, turned on its head by a decision that proclaims as did 
the Court, that it was the basis for the consequential order made in Amaechi v INEC to 
the effect that Amaechi should assume a position which lacked any foundation at all in 
law.  
   In view of its apex status in the judicial hierarchy, again a fact that was harped on by 
the justices in the case, the refusal of the Court to order a fresh election in Rivers State is 
not devoid of a strong touch of irony. Consider that not only has it declared the need for 
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the judicial process to focus on doing substantial rather than technical justice, it did in 
fact proclaim the same judicial virtue in this case. Specifically, the Court premised its far-
reaching decision in part, on the need to do substantial justice 
               In matters of this nature, this court will not allow technicalities to prevent it  
               from doing substantial justice…From the facts of this case, this court has the  
               power and the duty to invoke the provisions of Section 22 of the Supreme  
               Court Act, 1990…to grant …such relief that will completely determine all the  
               issues arising from enforcement of the judgement won by the appellant.54 
 
There is thus a tension between this declared extensive power of the Court and the 
position that it could not have ordered fresh elections in the case particularly in view of 
the rather tenuous basis of the consequential relief it granted Amaechi. 
   Further, the Court also adverted to the customary wide powers of a judicial forum with 
terminal powers in the adjudicatory process. Referring to the widely couched terms of 
Section 6 (6) (a) of the Constitution on judicial powers and Section 22  of the Supreme 
Court Act, it noted that ‘there can be no doubt that there is a plenitude of power 
available to this court to do which the justice of the case deserves.’55 
   The chain of events that followed the filing of Amaechi v INEC discussed above 
presents a profound representation of the travails that the judiciary can encounter in 
societies witnessing the judicialisation of politics. The intrigues that arose in the case as it 
progressed particularly exercised the authority and dignity of the Supreme Court. It is 
little wonder, if highly regrettable, that in repelling what was clearly a grave affront to its 
institutional integrity,  the Court sought recourse in preserving ‘the rule of law’ to foist a 
legal paradox that effectively inverted fundamental principles of majoritarian democracy. 
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       It emerges from the discussion on Amaechi v INEC and AC v INEC that the 
judiciary in Nigeria is actively involved in the democratisation process. Specifically, it has 
been playing a key role in the process of political accountability and the whole process of 
social transformation that underwrites the important process of transition from years of 
authoritarian military rule. It is only a transformed judiciary that can effectively play this 
critical role in transitioning and liberal democratic societies.  
   The Nigerian judiciary has a questionable record of accountability and has been cited 
for complicity in the country’s experience of authoritarian military rule. It is quite 
instructive that the exiting military administration tacitly agreed to the urgent need to 
reform the judiciary during its long hold on power by including provisions for 
establishment of the National Judicial Council in the ‘transition’ constitution. 
Institutional transformation sans accountability?: the case of the National Judicial 
Council  
Given the rot that had bedevilled the Nigerian judiciary in the authoritarian period, it is 
no surprise that the ‘transition’ Constitution of 1999 sought to make institutional 
arrangements for reforming the judiciary. This is captured in the establishment of the 
National Judicial Council (NJC), a centralised body for the appointment, discipline and 
promotion of judges in the country. The creation and activities of the NJC, particularly as 
it relates to the discipline of judicial officers bears on the issue of judicial accountability. 
   Established as one of fourteen ‘Federal Executive Bodies’ by section 153 of the 
Constitution, the NJC has very wide ranging powers on recommending judicial officers 
for appointment across the spectrum of the superior courts of records in Nigeria. The 
constitutional listing of the body, headed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), as a 
federal executive body is quite misleading. The creation of the body has been traced to 
 29 
the recommendations of the Eso Panel of Inquiry set up in 1993 by the Abacha military 
regime on the reorganisation and reformation of the Nigerian judiciary.56   
   In terms of composition, sixteen of its twenty three members are judicial officers, 
judges and justices of the High Courts, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.57 The 
other seven are legal practitioners of high professional standing. Of the latter group, five, 
nominated by the Nigerian Bar Association, only participate in the deliberations 
regarding the recommendation of persons for judicial appointment.58 The other two 
members not ‘jurisdictionally’ restricted, are nominated by the CJN. Thus, the pre-
eminent body is essentially a judicial affair. 
   The National Judicial Council has the power to recommend persons for judicial 
appointment to the head of the respective branch of the executive at the federal and state 
level. It similarly has powers to recommend their removal from office. Further, it has full 
disciplinary powers over judicial officers of all superior courts of record. It also has 
powers to ‘deal with all other matters relating to broad issues of policy and 
administration’59 of the judiciary. 
   In practice, the ‘recommendatory’ powers of the NJC have been potent, if not decisive, 
in the appointment and dismissal of judges. Its recommendations on judicial 
appointments have been the most important factor in nomination of judicial officers by 
the executive for screening and ratification by the legislature all over the country since 
the return to civil rule in 1999. It has been quite active in investigating complaints 
(petitions) of judicial misfeasance and recommending appropriate action on the part of 
the executive.  
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   On its recommendation, an unprecedented number of judges have been suspended or 
dismissed from office. It is significant to note that within three years of its operation, 
over 50 judicial officers had been investigated for corruption or other judicial 
misfeasance.60 By the end of 2005, more than a dozen had been dismissed as a result of 
its findings.61  And a couple of others have since been similarly dealt with. To date only 
justices of the Supreme Court have completely escaped the axe of the NJC.  
   However, the NJC has sometimes been criticised for high-handedness, failure to 
observe fair-hearing and selectivity in its recommendations. In some cases, its decisions 
have been challenged for eroding rather than affirming judicial independence.62 Joseph 
Otteh, Director of Access to Justice, a leading NGO, committed to an independent legal 
and judicial system in Nigeria, made the point very well when he noted that  
               Although the Council is making an important difference in the fight to control  
               corruption in the judicial estate and strengthen the independence of the judicial  
               branch, many might believe that the signals coming from the Council is now  
               mixed, and that the Council is missing opportunities, compromising  
               consistency, and undermining its own authority. 63 
 
   Interestingly, save in one instance however, judicial challenges to its decisions have 
been unsuccessful.64  
From the perspective of cohesion, the predominant composition of the body by judicial 
offices is one of the NJC’s strongest points. But it is also one its Achilles heels. Despite 
its acclaimed role in sanitising the judiciary, leading members of the NJC, including the 
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highest echelons of the judiciary, have themselves sometimes been mired in allegations of 
bribery and corruption.65  
Recall that the judiciary like all civil governance institutions in the country had suffered 
serious institutional decay. The administration of justice had come to disrepute from 30 
years of authoritarian military rule.66 Virtually all the judicial officers on the membership 
of the NJC (all of whom are there by various statutory permutations, notably their 
specific headship of levels of courts), were appointed to the bench by one or the other 
previous military administration in the first place.  
   It is pertinent to reiterate that judicial officers were exempted from administrative 
lustration applied to some public office-holders, especially serving military and a handful 
of police officers in government, retired as part of the transition measures and the 
demands for a break with the past. Thus, the NJC, since its inauguration in 1999, has by 
default been securely in the hands of the ‘old-guard’ in the judiciary. This is a body of 
judicial officers who had held office during a part of the authoritarian period. The 
judiciary as an institution, it has been argued, bears complicity for political illegitimacy, 
corruption and misgovernance for which it was not brought to account in the transition 
to civil rule.67  
   Not only the spectre of an unaccounted past, but well-founded apprehensions of 
unchanged ways, foreshadows the workings of the NJC. Critics have also identified 
inconsistencies in its operational procedures as well as a lack of courage in its approach 
to some cases.68 All of these have cast a serious slur on the institutional accountability 
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measure which the NJC represents (as far as its disciplinary powers are concerned) in the 
post-authoritarian period.  
   The current state of affairs regarding the operation of the NJC and its efforts at 
ensuring judicial accountability in Nigeria calls to mind, the argument that judicial 
accountability through an accessible public process ought to be made a significant part of 
transitional justice processes. In this regard, it has been argued that a publicly accessible 
mechanism of accountability in the nature of a truth-telling mechanism is well-suited to 
institutional scrutiny of the judiciary in transitions.69  
   On this view, it is not the argument that the truth-telling process should have taken the 
place of a body like the NJC. Nor is it the proposition that subjecting the judiciary to 
public accountability would have cured all its institutional short-comings. Rather, the 
contention is that ventilating the judicial role in the pre-transition period through the 
truth-telling process would have facilitated acknowledgement of its role in the suffering 
that the authoritarian period brought on the Nigerian society.  
   Perhaps more importantly, it would have facilitated a robust public engagement with 
the judiciary in the critical task of social reconstruction. Surely, the incidence of 
widespread judicialisation of politics all over the world has dispelled any hitherto existing 
doubts as to the ramifications of the judicial function in society and its direct implications 
for governance in contemporary times. In view of that, serious attention ought to be 
directed at the judicial function in societies in transition even in the same way as it is in 
liberal democracies. 
   As it is, the accountability gap on the institutional role of the judiciary in Nigeria during 
the country’s troubled period haunts the judicial function. It has continued to challenge 
its attempts at self-transformation and regulation constituted by the establishment of the 
NJC. The task of the NJC is not made any easier by the fact that it is a creation of a 
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constitution foisted on the country through an un-negotiated transition. It is thus no 
surprise that the NJC, with the best intentions, falls short of transforming the judiciary to 
a transparent institution.  
   At best, the operations of the NJC and its continued struggle to sanitise the judicial 
institution (a task which has continued to prove Herculean), has served as a constant 
reminder of the judicial accountability gap in the post-authoritarian period in which the 
judiciary has been saddled with great expectations.70 The NJC’s apparent inability to curb 
the level of judicial misfeasance eight years after its establishment gives cause for concern. 
Just when public confidence in the judiciary had improved considerably with the judicial 
interventions in the controversial 2007 elections, the NJC was saddled with investigating 
petitions on allegations of alarming sleaze on the part of some judges of the Electoral 
Petitions Tribunals in various parts of the country.71 
   More important to the discussion here, keen observation of the Nigerian socio-legal 
scene suggests judicial misfeasance is sometimes a product of political interference and 
defective legal and political (structural) arrangements.72 These implicate the need for a 
holistic approach to judicial transformation which a publicly accessible accountability 
process appears well adapted to.  
   The claim made here on public accountability of the judiciary as part of the transitional 
measures is a relatively modest one. Essentially, it is a route which is unlikely to have 
waived or obviated the need for a body in the conceptual nature of the NJC. Rather, it 
concedes the relevance of the NJC, designed as a permanent body for the rigorous 
monitoring, accountability and administration of the judiciary.     
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   In sum, the truth-telling process and the opportunity for public accountability it 
portends, would have provided a forum for constituting the NJC (or any such similar 
body), in a manner that would have better secured its potential for institutional 
transformation for which it is conceived. This would have been the case granted the 
benefit of an inquiry into the judicial function in the past. At the least, the NJC would 
have been constituted as a more representative body along societal aspirations for social 
reconstruction. Such a body would arguably assist in better fortifying the judicial 
institution against the vagaries of judicialised politics which potentially challenges any 
judiciary, drawn as the Nigerian courts are, into mediating highly contested political 
choices and questions. 
Robed into trouble: the challenges of a politicised judiciary     
Due to the flexible nature of political institutions in a democracy, courts face ‘inherent 
difficulties’ when they are placed in a position to supervise the political process.73 This 
difficulty would appear to stem from one of the basic characteristics of law, its 
predictable or fixed nature paired against the fluid character of political institutions.  
   The discussion of the cases in this article demonstrates judicialisation of politics can 
threaten judicial integrity itself. Just how exerting judicialised politics can be for the 
judicial function comes to the fore in how the Supreme Court felt in dire need of 
preserving the judicial institution by seeking justification in rule of law to undermine 
fundamental democratic principles and ethos of majoritarianism.  
   It is instructive that the Court took umbrage at the lawless conduct of the Defendants 
in the case. Decrying their efforts to foist a fait accompli on the courts in the matter, 
Oguntade JSC in the lead judgement lamented the intrigues that dogged the case and 
condemned the deplorable conduct of the Defendants. He noted that the PDP, INEC 
and Omehia had acted in a manner to frustrate Amaechi and the judicial process.  
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   The three Defendants did ‘everything possible to subvert the rule of law.’74 Worse still, 
they had jointly conducted themselves in manner that undermined the authority of the 
judiciary, holding it out before the public as an institution that was ‘supine and 
irrelevant.’75 However, as I alluded to above, it is important to note that in this particular 
instance, the authority of the judiciary was undermined with the active participation or 
more accurately, collusion, of the penultimate level of the judicial institution in Nigeria, 
the Court of Appeal. A critical commentary of the negative role of the Court of Appeal 
featured in the leading and contributory decisions of the justices of the Court.76 It is 
apposite to highlight the conduct of the Court of Appeal in the case.    
   At the time Amaechi v INEC went to the Court of Appeal in Abuja,77 that court had just 
decided a case on similar facts, Ugwu v Ararume78 which was then on further appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Ugwu v Ararume had also arisen from the fact of alleged illegal 
substitution by the PDP based on the same premise of ‘error.’ The Court of Appeal had 
declared the substitution of Ararume illegal and the appeal in the Supreme Court was on 
the dissatisfaction of the PDP with the judgement.  
   At the hearing of Amaechi v INEC on 4 April 2007, the Court of Appeal drew the 
attention of the parties to this fact. It sought and obtained their consent to adjourn the 
matter for the decision of the Supreme Court in Ugwu v Ararume. This was based on the 
understanding that the judgement in Ugwu v Ararume would be binding on it in deference 
to the principle of stare decisis. Following the agreement of the parties, the Court of 
Appeal adjourned the case to await the decision of the Supreme Court in the latter case 
which was to be delivered the next day. 
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   On 5 April 2007, nine clear days to the elections, the Court upheld the finding of the 
Court of Appeal in declaring the substitution of Ararume illegal. It thus cleared the way 
for the Court of Appeal to make a similar finding in Amaechi v INEC. But this was not to 
be. On 10 April 2007, the PDP expelled both Ararume and Amaechi, no doubt to 
frustrate the efficacy of the judgement of the apex court in favour of the former and pre-
empt a similar finding for the latter. To seal the fate of Ararume, the PDP further 
declared it was no longer fielding a candidate in Imo, the state for which he had been 
declared the party’s legally nominated candidate.79  
   But the PDP did not stop its rampage against rule of law there. The next day, along 
with Omehia, it proceeded to the Court of Appeal with an application that the appeal in 
Amaechi v INEC should be struck out. This was on the ground that consequent on his 
expulsion (which the latter had immediately challenged at another high court), he lacked 
the locus standi to sustain the case and the Court of Appeal, the jurisdiction to hear it.  
   Rather than reject the application and punish the PDP and perhaps Omehia for 
obvious contempt of the judicial process, the Court of Appeal acceded to the application 
and struck out Amaechi v INEC pending before it. But this decision was delivered on 16 
April, two days after the election, the dispute on who was the valid candidate of the PDP 
been held. Omehia had gone on to contest on the platform of the PDP and won. 
Amaechi hurriedly appealed to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Omehia waited to be 
sworn in on 29 May 2007. 
   The Supreme Court, on 11 May 2007 decided the matter. It found the Court of Appeal 
in error and ordered the case before the latter be heard ‘expeditiously’ on the merits. But 
on 21 May 2007, counsel to Omehia brought an application for stay of proceedings 
pending clarification of the directive of the Supreme Court.  On 25 May 2007, to the 
shock of observers, the Court of Appeal upheld the ludicrous claim, stating that it 
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required ‘further clarification’80 before it could obey the directive of the apex court. The 
Court of Appeal then granted a stay of proceedings. It further granted Omehia seven 
days within which to file an application before the Supreme Court to clarify its ruling. 
This action again cleared the way for Omehia to be sworn in as Governor of Rivers State.   
   In obvious exasperation at the conduct of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court in 
correspondence to the former insisted its directive was unambiguous. It ordered the 
Court of Appeal to comply with it, decrying its action as ‘an unfortunate development 
and ridicule on the hierarchy of courts.’81  
   Finally, the Court of Appeal delivered its judgement on 20 July 2007 on the merits of 
the case. The Court of Appeal distinguished the facts of Amaechi v INEC from Ugwu v 
Ararume. On that footing, it dismissed Amaechi’s claims. Thus the public and the legal 
community watched in bewilderment as the Court of Appeal openly violated its self-
imposed commitment made to the parties on how to proceed with the appeal. The action 
of the Court of Appeal in this regard amounted to a judicial ‘summersault’ and was, as 
the Supreme Court noted, a violation of a settled principle of Nigerian law.82  
   Perhaps more significantly, it affronted the fundamental principle of abiding by the 
principle of precedent, stare decisis, entrenched in the country’s common law tradition. 
There was hardly any reason to take a different view from the position that the Court of 
Appeal was acting a prepared script designed to buy time for the Defendants. Rather 
than follow the dictates of law, the Court of Appeal, as the Supreme Court noted, 
preferred to ‘dance to pedestrian tunes totally irrelevant in the case.’83    
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   Amaechi on his part proceeded to the Supreme Court for the third time where the 
matter was finally settled in his favour by the Supreme Court which relied heavily on its 
earlier decision in Ugwu v Ararume which arose contemporaneously and under similar 
facts with Amaechi v INEC. But as the Supreme Court lamented, the havoc had already 
been done. The Court of Appeal had assisted in actualising the scheme of the 
Defendants to ensure that Amaechi was excluded from the elections. As the Supreme 
Court noted, these chronicle of ‘improper behaviour’ on the part of the Defendants with 
the support of the Court of Appeal, ‘needlessly brought the administration of justice to 
disrepute.’84  
    The Supreme Court was right on point when it further declared that the judiciary, ‘like 
all citizens’ of Nigeria, cannot be impervious to attempts by anyone at subversion of the 
administration of justice.85 But clearly, such noble turn of mind is scarcely shared down 
the hierarchy of the judiciary itself.  
   The attitude of the Court of Appeal in Amaechi V INEC is a sad reminder of the 
institutional malaise of judicial corruption, indiscipline and misfeasance. All of these had 
dogged the judicial function in the country during the authoritarian period. They have 
continued to feature sometimes with bizarre dimensions in the transition to civil rule. 
This is especially the case with at the lower levels of the court system coming as it has, 
under the strong influence of the political elite, particularly at the state level.  
   A prominent method of judicial misfeasance is the grant of ex parte injunctions. The 
judicial grant of such orders, a notorious feature of the authoritarian era, had from time 
to time reared its head in the transition period. Despite the judicially sanctioned urgency 
of combating the scourge of corruption in the country,86 the country’s anti-corruption 
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agency lamented the judiciary was frustrating its efforts to prosecute well-heeled accused 
persons through indiscriminate grant of ex parte orders to stall their prosecution.87  
   To cite but one recent topical example, a state governor recently applied to and 
obtained from a federal high court, an ex parte injunction to stop the investigatory 
activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission against his predecessor for 
abuse of office and misappropriation of state funds running into millions of dollars 
during his eight year tenure. The injunction included prayers to halt the investigatory 
body’s request for official documents on financial transactions during the period.88  
   So rampant were instances of unlawful grant of ex-parte orders that a number of judges 
were dismissed for granting them. Such orders have contributed immensely to disrespect 
for judicial authority in the country. Thus, when the Federal Government rushed to and 
secured one such order from a Lagos High Court to forestall an impending nationwide 
industrial action, it was disregarded by the national workers union. In rebuff, the 
leadership of the workers congress dubbed it a ‘black market’ injunction89 not worth the 
paper it was written on.  
   Another angle to the consequences of judicialisation of politics is the variegated 
responses it evokes in the public (and political domain) and the implications of the 
responses for the rule of law. Reactions to judicial determination of overly political cases 
can range from acceptance and due compliance by the political branches to studied 
silence or outright rejection of such decisions. In cases where the jurisprudential basis is 
opaque, it could simply lead to multiplication of legal challenges on the issues in dispute. 
And this last is the case with Amaechi v INEC.  
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   After an initial prevarication, realising reabsorbing Amaechi into the party was the least 
line of resistance in its bid to hold on to power in Rivers State, he was reconciled into the 
fold of the PDP after his inauguration. Not surprisingly however, candidates of some 
other parties who participated in the election alongside Omehia have since returned to 
the courts to challenge the Supreme Court decision.90 Thus, the circle of litigation ignited 
by his illegal substitution has continued full blast, even after he was sworn in as the first 
governor in the country’s history who never contested in the elections in which he was 
judicially declared winner.  
   The proclivity for re-litigation is sometimes plain expression of the bad-loser attitude 
prevalent among the country’s political elite. The seeming endless circle of litigation on 
matters that have ostensibly been laid to rest by the decision of the highest court in the 
country has the potential to weaken judicial authority. However, such institutional 
weakening may be self-inflicted.  
   At the least, the public reaction to Amaechi v INEC suggests it is sometimes driven by 
questionable jurisprudential leanings of a judiciary confronted with the challenges of a 
society yearning for social reformation and its (judicial) institutional burden of an 
unaccounted past. The implications of the decision more than any other in recent 
memory, for the democratisation process, has been subject of intense public discussion.   
   The public reaction has been largely mixed. There is a general support for the Court’s 
serious attempt to salvage the rule of law from the almost unrelenting assault of the 
principle by the political class. To this group, the judiciary has been instrumental in 
preventing anarchy in the country, acting as a forum for the resolution of very 
contentious disputations and misuse of power as demonstrated by the cases discussed in 
this article.  
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   The judiciary has been credited for acting as a stabilising force in the political process 
and preventing the break of law and order which has occurred elsewhere in Africa. Not 
surprisingly, leading members of the legal profession have featured prominently in the 
vanguard of support for the increased judicial role in the political process in the 
country.91  
   Ironically, on the same score, the Court has come under heavy criticism for an 
unprecedented and in its turn, dangerous, violation of majoritarian democratic principles. 
This has been the response of some to the decision in Amaechi v INEC for instance. To 
this latter group, the Court was wrong in its declaration of an invalidly excluded 
candidate as the winner of a state-wide general election. Some highly placed members of 
the political elite, particularly in the opposition, fear such decisions could derail the 
democratic process.92  
   Institutional transformation and strengthening of the judiciary, in view of its potential 
to foster development and the rule of law, is a key aspiration in a democratising polity. 
Thus weakening the judicial function is, to say the least, clearly undesirable. This is 
particularly so in the Nigerian context where the political branches suffer from 
democratic legitimacy deficit and the judiciary is the temporally, the viable public option 
for deepening the democratic culture and instituting accountability in governance.93 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing analyses disclose that the political branches have through their 
contestations for hegemony and domination, provided ample opportunity for the 
ascendance of the judiciary as a principal force in governance and democratisation in a 
polity yearning for social reconstruction. The judiciary intervenes in setting the ground 
rules for political competition within the democratic space opened up after years of 
military authoritarian rule. It is also at the vanguard of preserving the rule of law assailed 
almost continuously by a largely-self serving political elite with suspect legitimacy 
credentials.  
   Despite considerable public approbation, the waters of a troubled transition sometimes 
prove too treacherous for otherwise well-intentioned judicial interventions. This leads to 
quite questionable adjudication and jurisprudential preferences which threaten rather 
than promote important social values like democracy and the rule of law.  Further, in the 
course of playing an important role in the task of ensuring political accountability, 
institutional as well as social reconstruction and rule of law-building, it soon becomes 
apparent that the judiciary is itself severely challenged by the malaise of a deep–rooted 
accountability gap. The gap in judicial accountability and resultant institutional 
distortions it leads to complicate the judicial attempt at fostering the rule of law 
particularly in democratising societies. 
    AC v INEC and Amaechi v INEC aptly present the directionalities of the phenomenon 
of judicialisation of politics and the inversed impact of politicisation of the judiciary. The 
judiciary ought to play an important role in the reinstitution of the rule of law and 
deepening of democratic culture, both important aspirations in transitional societies. The 
judiciary has a very critical role in promoting social transformation, at the heart of 
transitioning processes.  
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   This does not however obviate the challenges inherent in that enterprise, a critical one 
being the potential for politicisation of a judiciary actively engaged with policy and 
political decision-making processes. The judicialisation of politics may be quite desirable, 
sometimes an imperative, in the context of transitional societies in particular, it presents 
serious challenges to a judiciary not well prepared to take on the daunting task. 
   The discussion in this article provide opportunity for critical reflection on an important 
aspect of transition politics in post-authoritarian Nigeria, namely the (mis) use of state 
agencies and institutional organs for exclusion in the electoral process. The relevance of 
the focus on this issue in the democratisation process in Nigeria is germane. A more 
sinister and extreme weapon, ‘political’ assassinations have become a notorious feature of 
elitist power struggles from the inception of the political transition in 1999 to date.94  
  The recourse to judicial intervention for resolving debacles on individual participatory 
rights are thus quite important in as much as they constitute a formal and decorous 
mechanism for disputes resolution. Perhaps even more important is the opportunity they 
offer for sustaining the culture of democracy in the Nigerian society. 
   Assuaging sectional frustrations based on feelings of exclusion and marginalisation, real 
and imagined, had been a justificatory staple for military intervention in the country’s 
politics right from the outset in post-independent Nigeria. After nearly three decades of 
predatory authoritarian military rule, just how opportunistic the claim has been in the 
hands of ambitious military officers is now a matter of significant historical record of 
accounts of governance in the country.         
   In Amaechi v INEC, perhaps more than in any other it has decided in the country’s 
current democratic transition, the Court boldly acknowledged the highly politicised 
nature of the case before it. References to democracy and democratic principles are 
replete in the various contributions to the unanimous decision of the highest judicial 
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panel in the Nigerian polity. Ironically, it is also one that would likely be recorded in the 
country’s judicial annals as one decided on extremely suspect democratic foundations. 
Many Nigerians seem to excuse the decision on the basis of the expedience of protecting 
judicial integrity rather than sound principles of law, equity or democratic virtue law to 
which the decision strenuously pretends. And so probably will posterity. 
 
 
